The article analyzes the failed attempt to delineate political and civil service positions in Ukraine. It provides an overview of an episode of civil service reform in Ukraine when the state secretaries' institute was established. The reform failed and positions of state secretaries established in 2001, were eliminated in 2003. However, the dual problem of combining political and administrative/merit-based considerations still exists in Ukraine as well as in many other countries in Europe and Central Asia region. The analysis of the situation in Ukrainian public administration sector is based on the model suggested by Svara (2001) using the framework with two dimensions: political control and professional independence. The article concludes that major reasons of the reform failure include administrative top-down launch of the reform, mismatch between declared and real rationale behind it, and internal resistance that the reform faced.
Introduction
The article is an analysis of an attempt to delineate political and administrative functions within the government that Ukraine had undertaken between 2001 and 2003. It was done by introducing state secretaries' positions in the ministries that were supposed to be administrative managers of the ministry and ensure implementation of the policy decisions of the minister. The reform failed and all the initiatives undertaken during this period were cancelled. The focus of the article is on political economy analysis of the reform implementation in Ukraine and identification of factors that impeded the implementation and caused reversal of the reform. In order to put the discussion of the Ukrainian case into broader context, the brief description of theoretical concept and international practices is presented drawing on work of Matheson et al. (2007) , Carboni (2010) , 'T Hart et al (2006) . The analysis of the situation in Ukrainian public administration sector is based on the model suggested by Svara (2001) and assesses introduced changes in terms of political control over state secretaries and their professional independence.
The research concludes that most of the reasons behind reform failure were of political economy nature. It describes features of political economy environment that led to failure of delineating of political and civil service posts in Ukraine. Neither ministers nor state secretaries in Ukraine performed purely political or administrative functions but rather constituted parallel power lines. The political economy environment in case of Ukraine resulted in power fight between Cabinet of Ministers and Presidential office, competition between ministers and state secretaries and resulting lack of trust in the proposed reform from all the actors. The lessons learned could be applied in other countries considering similar type of reforms by identifying similar political economy issues and designing measures to mitigate risks of failure.
Theoretical Framework and International Experience
The theoretical concept of the relationship between politicians and bureaucracy dates back to the work of Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber and is focused on politics-administration dichotomy. The underlying idea of this concept is that politicians act as representatives of political interests and programs while bureaucrats act as implementers of the policy, whose major concern is efficiency. The recent research however showed that interaction patterns between politicians and bureaucrats are more complex and interlinked, and high level civil servants inevitably play political roles while delivering public service to the citizens. Svara (2001) offers a framework for analysis of politics-administration dichotomy that is based on the assumption that politicians and bureaucrats are highly interdependent in performing their functions. The framework sets two directions: political control (capacity of politicians to set directions and maintain oversight) and professional independence (capacity of civil service for policy formulation and implementation). Svara argues that high level political control and high level of professional independence result in optimal situation of complementarity.
The solutions different countries have chosen to find a balance between political appointees and high level civil servants vary considerably. Italian example is described by Carboni (2010) . In Italy, the principle of separation between politicians and top executives has been affirmed by law since 1993. And in the course of 1990s the reforms continued in a way that gave senior civil servants more autonomy over expenditure and responsibility for technical and administrative implementation of policy. Simultaneously, in 1998 Italy adopted "spoils" system for grade 1 and 2 civil servants (vice ministers and undersecretaries) who have to be confirmed or removed from their position within three months of each new legislature. An important part of the reform aimed at increasing accountability was focus on performance evaluation with assessment bodies established and current plans to create a new central independent agency dedicated to evaluation of administrative structures and civil servants' performance.
" T Hart et al (2006) describe the situation in the Netherlands pointing out that as a result of reforms, namely use of competence-based selection and promotion, shifted civil service to focus on performance and collaboration across departments to achieve results. However, it also created problem of mutual frustration of top civil servants and ministers and feeling that ministers cannot fully rely on civil servants. Although norms governing relationship between politicians and civil servants reflect interdependency, the risk avoidance behavior of both politicians and civil servants results in less productive collaboration. Matheson, Manning et al (2007) describe issues of delineation of responsibilities between ministers and senior civil servants in their study of a dozen of European and non-European countries. Their main findings are that while all the counties adhere to non-partisanship of public service, process for senior appointments is still political. Most of the countries use hybrid procedure (combination of both political and administrative one) for both appointment and dismissal of high level civil servants. In some cases a clear line is drawn between senior staff appointed politically and lower ones appointed using administrative procedure. In others, senior staff is appointed though hybrid procedure when merit based selection criteria apply and meeting these criteria is a necessary condition for any appointment but political decision is made from those that comply (e.g. Belgium). Another finding is that some countries have formal restrictions which spell out division of responsibility between ministers and civil servants (e.g., U.S., United Kingdom, Korea, New Zealand) and define certain functional areas that are outside of ministerial oversight (e.g., New Zealnd and UK for areas such as land registration or accounting officers role). The institutional oversight arrangements also play critical role in proper functioning of the executive but there is no uniform model and there are different combinations of involvement of legislature and judiciary.
Overall, international practices of delineation of responsibilities between politicians and civil servants show that consensus agreement on the roles and responsibilities between the two and mutual trust in executing their responsibilities in is critical for delivering high quality public services efficiently.
Institute of State Secretaries: Prior Context and Reform Design
Ukrainian civil service system was originates from the Soviet times when a "gild" system existed. Civil servants belonged to one party and most of civil servants would make career within the system from the bottom either through "party" path or through "executive" path. Since independence of Ukraine in 1991, system changed somewhat chaotically but utilized bureaucratic apparatus inherited from the Soviet Union. However, with the time previous civil service became more politicized and most senior positions became part of the political "bargain". By the end of the 1990s, Ukraine had arrived at the system of public administration that could be characterized as "political dominance" in the framework developed by Svara (2001) that undermined continuity and professionalism of civil service especially at the higher level. The situation resembled to some extend Italy of the 1980s or Mexico in the 1990s where political "tribes" dominated civil service. However the response to the problem was much less comprehensive and turned out to be limited to just an attempt to introduce state secretaries.
Below is an overview of the political structure in the early 2000s that would help to set a stage for further analysis of the state secretaries' reform. At the time the public administration reform was actively discussed, Ukraine had a presidentialparliamentary system with separate executive, judicial, and legislative branches. The President was a chief of state responsible for foreign policy, and acted as a guarantor of sovereignty of Ukraine. While Cabinet of Ministers was heading the executive power according to the Constitution of Ukraine, the President de facto had considerable leverage over the executive power. The Prime Minister was appointed by the President with the consent of parliamentary majority. The Prime Minister and vice prime ministers were appointed by the Parliament per submission by the President. Cabinet ministers were appointed by the President based on a submission by the Prime Minister. The parliament initiated legislation, ratified international agreements, and approved the budget.
While Cabinet of Ministers as executive power was responsible for domestic policy in all areas, the President could also initiate any reforms through laws and presidential decrees. At the time of the reform, tensions between the President and the Cabinet of Ministers were frequent due to multi-party nature of the Parliament and need for the President to find compromises with political parties.
The civil service legal framework prior to the reform had a number of fundamental problems and backed politicization of civil service in Ukraine. The following overview of the legal framework is based on SIGMA Assessment (2006). The Law on Civil Service was passed in 1993, three years before the adoption of the new Constitution and only two years after the collapse of the Soviet system. The legislation of this period was generally weak, as at this time proper law-drafting practices had not yet been established. Moreover, the civil service in the Soviet Union had different objectives and obligations than those required in a democratic state. As a result, the form and content of the Law on Civil Service corresponded more to the Soviet approach to civil service than to the approach established by the Constitution of Ukraine of 1996, even if the latter had some weaknesses concerning the constitutional foundations of public administration. Although the Law on Civil Service had been amended several times since between 1996 and 2001, the basic legislation regulating the scope of civil service and employment of civil servants was underdeveloped and obsolete. For example, the main principles of the civil service, as stipulated in the Constitution, are not reflected in -and protected by -the civil service legislation. Legal provisions were too general and lack key criteria both for the identification of the scope of civil service and for employment related procedures. Lack of regulation caused inconsistency and fuzziness of all other legal acts in the area.
The history of the state secretaries' reform in Ukraine starts as a part of larger public administration reform set out in the Concept of administrative reform approved by the Order of the President of Ukraine #810 in 1998 that defined the need to improve implementing and policy making capacity of the executive power agencies to address problems accumulated by that time. The Concept envisaged that political and administrative functions should be separated.
The public administration reform was not build around consensus and was managed in a fragmented manner. The public administration reform in Ukraine was polycentric with responsibilities divided between Presidential Administration, Cabinet of Ministers Secretariat, Ministry of Economy and Main Civil Service Department under the President. Coordination was not sufficient and not enough attention was paid to awareness building and increasing capacity to absorb reform by the Government. Thus, the reform was fragmented and no consensus between major players ever existed.
The reform envisaging delineation between politics and administrative functions was introduced rather hastily and unexpectedly for most of the interested parties and implemented mainly through legal tools. At the same time, the Law on Civil Service that was effective at the time of state secretaries' reform implementation did not contain any provisions differentiating between the civil service and politics -when defining the main principles of the civil service (article 3), the law did not include principles of political neutrality or independence of the civil service, among the principles set by the Civil Service Law. Therefore, the basic conditions needed to ensure the separation of political and administrative spheres were not fulfilled, and additional definitions in President's acts were out of coherent legal framework.
Reform Implementation
The rapid introduction of the state secretaries was done out of context of the broad public administration reform and thus created considerable imbalances between ministers and state secretaries. In the Decree of the President of May 29, 2001, functions of a state secretary not only included managing apparatus of the ministry but also overlapped with functional responsibilities of a minister. In particular, state secretary obtained rights to approve the organizational structure of the ministry and its budget with Ministry of Finance approval. Also, a state secretary was in charge for staffing issues (except for patronage service) not only for ministry apparatus but also for regional units of the ministry. It resulted in the fact that state secretaries had more powers than the ministers. For example, head of Presidential Administration at the time, Mr. Lytvyn noted in the interview to Interfax News Agency that all key decisions are made by state secretaries. Another considerable change was that state secretary withdrawn ministers of power to decide on responsibility division of the ministry staff. The rapidness of the reform initiation and considerable powers given to the state secretaries may suggest that the reform was an attempt to strengthen presidential powers and increase the leverage that the President had over the executive rather than the reform to ensure delineation of political and administrative responsibilities in policy making and policy implementation.
The roles and responsibility of state secretaries were defined in yet another Order of the President of July 14, 2001 On Sample Terms of Reference of a State Secretary. According to this order, the state secretary is in charge of ensuring implementation of the tasks of the ministry and/or Minister as a member of Cabinet as well as routine work on managing the ministry. In particular, state secretary responsibilities included organizing work of apparatus of the ministry, preparation and submission for Minister's approval of the ministry's program and work plan as well as coordination of their implementation and reporting to the minister on ministry's performance.
However such division created tension -policy-making role of ministers was not shaped and administrative role was taken away. As opposed to most European countries described in the previous section, ministers in Ukraine were not pure politicians but rather a mix of political figures and civil servants. As was noted before, ministers were appointed by the President per proposal of the Prime Minister, while Prime Minister and Vice Prime Ministers were appointed by the Parliament per proposal of the President as a result of political bargain and compromise. At the same time all cabinet members were considered civil servants with civil servants grades and categories. On top of that, public management in Ukraine was not geared toward results and performance but focused on managing inputs and outputs of budget programs.
Although state secretaries' positions were established as pure civil service posts, de facto many of the appointed state secretaries were active in politics (Kovrygenko, 2001) . The legislative framework did not address this issue since the political neutrality principle was not defined as described in the previous section of the article. Thus, the situations occurred when state secretaries and ministers belonged to different parties with different political programs that contributed to rivalry between ministers and state secretaries.
Under such circumstances, with personnel and budget in the hands of state secretaries, ministers felt vulnerable. As a result of these tensions, the responsibilities of state secretaries were reshuffled several times of three years of their existence. Given strong role of politics in public administration, ministers needed real power and control over budget. The original Decree of the President issued in May 2001 was followed by orders of July 2001 and of January 2002. The Decree of July 2001 took a step back in direction of strengthening minister's powers. The state secretary only prepared proposal on organizational structure and budget of the ministry that then was approved by the minister. All the staffing issues also started to require approval of the minister. The Decree of January 2002 moved even further -a minister not only had a power to approve propose by the state secretary organization structure and appoint heads of regional branches but also to define responsibilities of the first deputy state secretary and deputy state secretaries.
As a result of constant changes in roles, more ambiguity on scope of responsibilities of state secretaries was created; in particular, number of deputy state secretaries varied considerably and division of responsibilities was often unclear. The July Decree of the President set that state secretary could have one first deputy and three deputies. However, it contained a norm that President can set different number of deputy state secretaries depending on a ministry. Although contradictory, the norm was even more complicated during implementation -not only number of deputies varied but number of state secretaries was different depending on a ministry. In the paper prepared by Valevsky and Kononchuk (2003) , detailed analysis of implementation of the state secretary reform was made and evidence showed that Ministry of Fuel and Energy and Ministry of Industrial Policy had two state secretaries each. In the Ministry of Healthcare where one state secretary was in place, there were three first deputies responsible for different areas. Thus, implementation of the state secretary institute turned into regular deputy minister practice that existed prior to 2001. This practice also created ambiguities in responsibilities of the state secretary. For example, state secretary was in charge of asset management according to the Presidential Decree -however, the Decree never specified that situation with multiple state secretaries is possible and who would perform which functions should that happen.
Appointment procedure undermined political neutrality of a state secretary position but tried to move this position out of control of the executive and under control of the President and created even more rivalry between ministers and state secretaries. Given that at the time Ukraine was presidential-parliamentary republic, the introduction of state secretaries could be viewed as an attempt to strengthen role of Presidential administration in the executive. Appointment procedure defined that the President had the right to appoint and dismiss state secretaries and their deputies. Prior to 2001 deputy ministers were also appointed by the President, the difference was that minister actually was fully withdrawn from this decision. Thus, prime minister suggested state secretary to be appointed by the President and the newly appointed state secretary submitted candidates for deputy state secretaries directly to the President (up until 2002 Decree). That increased presence of the President in administrative management of executive simultaneously decreasing the role of a minister and Cabinet. Moreover, based on the evidence described in the literature (Valevsky and Kononchuk 2003; Koliushko 2002) de facto there was no competitive procedure for selection of state secretaries and their deputies which would be expected given non-political nature of these positions. The qualification requirements specified in July Decree of the President could have been easily manipulated since there was a statement that a privilege could be granted to any civil servant based on the initiative and past record he or she had. Thus, the appointment of high civil servants was not merit-based as in Westminster system countries and though it was political, it did not serve the purpose of increasing role of a minister as political leader and building his or her confidence in state secretaries.
This "spoils" system (i.e., de facto political procedure for appointment and dismissal of state secretaries and deputy state secretaries) had the same flaws as the previous one and instead of building trust between ministers and state secretaries, it stressed once again the Presidential "ownership" of the reform. July order of the President clearly stated that resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers does not lead to dismissal of state secretaries however state secretaries are appointed for the term of the President and resign once the new President is elected. International practice suggests that some countries use purely administrative or hybrid systems of appointment which are competitive (Denmark, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Belgium), others use political system (Sweden, France, Poland). However, political appointments in civil service are used to create an interaction mechanism between apparatus and minister rather than an alternative power.
The reality was different and the turnover of state secretaries had proven that few survived even during one Presidential term undermining continuity and intended non-political nature of a position. As shown in empirical research of Valevsky and Kononchuk (2003) during the period of 2001-2003 there were over fifty Presidential decrees on dismissal of state secretaries and their deputies. For, example Ministry of Finance had four state secretaries within three year period. Also, several state secretaries then became ministers which again proves that state secretary institute did not adequately separate political and administrative position in the executive. State secretaries were changed not even due to the "spoils" system and definitely they did not enjoy civil service tenure.
Thus, introduction of state secretaries created antagonism between ministers and state secretaries rather then complementarity of the roles. The reform ended up shifting interaction between politicians and administrators from political dominance at the end of the 1990s to de jure bureaucratic autonomy with strong state secretaries. But de facto it turned out to still be a system of political dominance with shift of the power from Cabinet to Presidential Administration and resulted in ministers being biggest opponents of the reform. The situation was rather unique for Ukraine and takes roots in the fact that attempt to separate politicians from bureaucrats was made before political structure of power had stabilized and the reform became hostage of power battle.
The pressure within the system was building and as suddenly as introduced, the institute of state secretary was abolished, however, not much changed in substance while the balance of powers slightly moved. The Decree of the President of May 26, 2003 liquidated institute of state secretaries and reinstated position of deputy ministers. Some analysts view that as a recognition of the fact that attempt to separate political and administrative positions in the executive failed, while others attribute it to political situation and appointment of coalition Government headed by Mr. Yanukovych.
Abolishment of state secretaries has given the decisive authority over ministries to ministers while other functions were assigned to deputy ministers that replaced state secretaries. According to the Decree of the President of May 26, 2003, ministers kept their responsibilities as members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine including personal responsibility in development and implementation of the public policy, and coordination of the central executive power bodies in implementing activities in the area concerned. The functions that used to be carried out by state secretaries such us decisions on administrative budget of a ministry, approval of the ministry structure, and staffing numbers per approval of the Ministry of Finance.
Another fact showing political background of a decision to abolish state secretaries is that in August of 2003 twenty two out of thirty newly appointed deputy ministers used to work either as state secretaries or as deputy state secretaries. What did change is that minister received right not only to "manage" sector but also to manage apparatus of the ministry and functions that used to be ones of state secretary moved back to the minister.
Conclusions and Lessons Learned
The introduction of state secretaries in Ukraine failed to achieve its main objective -creation of efficient system of public administration with proper separation of political and administrative functions. The reform did shape functions of the minister as a policy maker but did not create a layer of top officials who can implement the policy in professional manner and simultaneously be trusted by a minister.
State secretaries reform was done out of context of broader public administration reform agenda and could be characterized as trial for reform survival. The decision was made rapidly and in a closed mode without discussion with public, politicians and civil service. Thus, there was never a broad consensus on the reform among major stakeholders. Factor that played major role in countries like Italy, Netherlands or Mexico while they were modernizing their systems. And while rapid reforms could bear benefits as in the case of Georgia public administration, it was not the case of Ukraine for political economy reasons. The attempt to delineate political and civil service positions in the Government, turned out to be a case of "isomorphic mimicry" by creating a vertical subordinated to the President which would be parallel to the Cabinet of Ministers. Although President was a center of power in Ukraine at the time, attempt to strengthen the role in operational management of ministries was never envisaged in legislation and turned out to become a political power struggle.
The state secretaries were not properly integrated into the executive. Ministers did not understand their policy-making role felt that state secretaries "run the show" undermining ministers' power. The proper competitive selection of the state secretaries and their deputies never was in place and even in course of political appointment process minister was withdrawn of his/her voice in selection, which compromised positive sides of both political and administrative appointment systems.
